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The interactions between players of prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game are reconstructed with evolu-
tionary game data. All participants play the game with their counterparts and gain corresponding
rewards during each round of the game. However, their strategies are updated asynchronously
during the evolutionary PD game. Two inference methods of the interactions between players
are derived with naive mean-field (nMF) approximation and maximum log-likelihood estimation
(MLE) respectively. The two methods are tested numerically also for fully connected asymmet-
ric Sherrington-Kirkpatrick (SK) models, varying the data length, asymmetric degree, payoff and
system noise (coupling strength). We find that the reconstruction mean square error (MSE) of
MLE method is proportional to the inverse of data length and typically half (benefit from the extra
information of update times) of that by nMF. Both methods are robust to the asymmetric degree
but works better for large payoff. Compared with MLE, nMF is more sensitive to the couplings
strength which prefers weak couplings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks can be generally used for describing systems
composed by interacting elements. Such systems usually
generate big time-series data based on the underlying dy-
namics or mechanics. Uncovering the network structures
from observations is crucial to understand the collective
dynamics of the systems and has attracted great interest
in different fields, ranging from biology system [1–4] to
social science [5–7].
Meanwhile, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game has
long been studied for the emergence of cooperation
among connected (links of the network) selfish individ-
uals (nodes of the network). With the PD game, the
criminals could take cooperation (confessing the crime
to the judge) or defection (denying the crime) strategy.
A large number of studies have focused on the collective
behaviors with different network structures, e.g., small-
world network [8], two-dimensional lattice [9] and scale-
free network [10], etc.. Furthermore, the couplings be-
tween players are typically symmetric and binary (with
/ without interactions) between players in those studies.
To quantify the strength of interactions between players,
here we studied fully connected asymmetric Sherrington-
Kirkpatrick (SK) [11] models, with an asymmetric degree
parameter could be varying between 0 and 1. Thus the
couplings between players are Gaussians and not neces-
sarily symmetric, which are more closer to the realities
in natural social systems. We are more interested in the
reconstruction of the couplings between players instead
of the collective behaviours of the system.
For an evolutionary PD game, the players’ strategies
follow a binary-state dynamics, which could be naturally
∗ qsminside@gmail.com
mapped into binary state, i.e., +1 for cooperation and
−1 for defection. Hence, it is straightforward to pose the
coupling inference problem for an evolutionary game into
the inverse Ising problem. There are many related algo-
rithms to recovering the couplings for the inverse Ising
problems, as reviewed in [12] and references therein.
Generally, the couplings can be reconstructed by equi-
librium [13–15] or non-equilibrium [16–20] model given
the time-dependent/independent system data. However,
in many applications, equilibrium Ising models are typi-
cally not the ideal choice for network inference and sta-
tistical modeling of the data. A mismatch between the
real couplings and the inferred ones can be seen for large
systems [3, 21, 22]. This is mainly because these systems
have the out-of-equilibrium nature and asymmetric cou-
plings between elements. Thus, researchers have moved
to the kinetic Ising models, developed exact and approx-
imate methods for network reconstruction [3, 19, 20, 23],
which has wider generality.
With kinetic Ising models, spins could update syn-
chronously or asynchronously. Similarly, with evolution-
ary games, synchronous means all players update their
strategies simultaneously at every time step [24]. This
can be mathematically described by a finite difference
equation, but rarely exists in social or natural systems.
The players, or organisms usually act at different and
uncorrelated times with the coming information which
may be delayed and imperfect [25]. For instance, a neu-
ron will be in a refractory period after releasing a spike,
it cannot respond to an input signal because it is still
processing or recovering from the previous input signal
[26, 27]. The dynamics of such asynchronous update is
usually expressed by differential equations, whose solu-
tions are not always the same with those of their finite-
difference counterparts. Thus players will update their
strategies asynchronously here, even though all of them
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2get their corresponding rewards through the game with
and from all neighbors. With asynchronous updates of
strategies, only one player will be assigned to update the
strategy in one game round. For finite number of players
N this is not exactly the asynchronous update described
above, but we do not see any differences at least for ki-
netic Ising models [19, 20].
For the network reconstruction with evolutionary game
data, some inference methods [28, 29] have been devel-
oped based on compressive sensing technique [30], which
is a paradigm for sparse-signal reconstruction. How-
ever, the compressive sensing methodology works with
assumptions that the interactions between individuals
should be explicit and stationary and the system could
be handled linearly in some way. For example, in the
studies of [29, 31, 32], the observations are the strategies
and the total payoff of each player in the evolutionary
game. Furthermore, all agents are assumed to play the
same game with a given payoff matrix. One player’s total
payoff is hence the sum of the payoff from all neighbors.
In studies [33–35], the dynamical functions are employed,
but which can also be decomposed into a linear sum of
scalar basis functions.
Be distinct from compressive sensing based inference
methods, we present here an exact method which is in-
tuitive and based on maximum-log-likelihood estimation
(MLE). Another approximate reconstruction method
is presented also which is based on naive mean-field
(nMF) approximation. Both of the derived inference for-
mula for evolutionary PD game data is enlighten by the
asynchronously updated Glauber dynamics [36], which
could converge to a stationary state described by Gibbs-
Boltzman distribution when the couplings are symmet-
ric. However, this is not necessarily true for synchronous
case. Hence, we are interested in using a kinetic Ising-
like model to reconstruct an evolutionary game network
dynamically.
With evolutionary PD game, the update times {τi},
history of strategies {si(t)} and rewards for each player
{xi(t)} are the full model data generated during the game
process. MLE needs all of these data while nMF does not
need the update times, neither the rewards for each game
round. nMF method relies on means, correlations and
the temptation of defection parameter b parameter in the
payoff matrix. With massive numerical simulations, we
find that the nMF performs very close to MLE method
while avoid long-time iteration process. One equilibrium
inference method also tested for the sake of completeness,
which shows poor reconstruction for the couplings of our
non-equilibrium processes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we present
the testing network structure as well as the dynamics
for the PD evolutionary game. In Sec. III, we derive
the MLE and nMF inference formulae from evolutionary
game data. Sec. IV, presents how these two methods
perform for the network reconstruction, while Sec. V
summarizes and discusses the results.
II. ASYMMETRIC SK MODEL AND
GLAUBER-LIKE GAME DYNAMICS
The quenched aSK model is composed by N vertices,
which represents N game player with two kinds of strate-
gies (si = 1 for cooperation while si = −1 for defection).
This is a fully connected model, i.e., all players are con-
nected to each other. The interactions Jij between each
pair of players have the form of
Jij = J
s
ij + kJ
as
ij , k ≥ 0, (1)
with k the asymmetric degree of these interactions, while
Jsij = J
s
ji and J
as
ij = −Jasji are symmetric and asymmet-
ric matrices, respectively. They are Gaussian random
variables with means 0 and variances
σ2(Jsij) = σ
2(Jasij ) =
g2
N
1
1 + k2
. (2)
The players do not play game with themselves. This
indicates Jii = 0 and the diagonal elements of J
s
ij and
Jasij are 0 as well.
We now describe the dynamics for evolutionary game
on the above aSK network model. Within an evolution-
ary PD game, the judge knows the players are crimi-
nal but without evidences. Then a player has two pos-
sible strategies (S): cooperation (confess their crime to
the judge) or defection (deny their offense to the judge).
They will get different payoff when they take different
strategies. The rewards are usually expressed by a pay-
off matrix X, for the prisoner dilemma (PD) game:
X =
(
1 0
b 0
)
, (3)
with 1 ≤ b ≤ 2. If both players choose cooperation, then
each of them will get a reward of 1; if one takes cooper-
ation while the counterpart defects, then the cooperated
one will get a reward of 0 while the defected one gets b
(temptation of defection); if both players choose defec-
tion, then none of them will get any rewards.
During each time step t, all players play games simulta-
neously and get corresponding rewards according to the
payoff matrix X in matrix (3). Thus, for each player,
the rewards come form the games played with as well as
from the neighbours. Once they get the rewards from the
game, one randomly chosen player i will be assigned to
update his strategy according to the following formula:
P (si(t)) =
exp
(∑
j Jijxj(t− 1)δsj(t−1),si(t)
)
Zi(t)
, (4)
where
Zi(t) =
∑
si(t)=±1
exp
∑
j
Jijxj(t− 1)δsj(t−1),si(t)

is the normalization factor (local partition function),
which sums over both cooperation and defection states
of player i.
3We denote the cooperative and defective strategy of
player i at time t as αi(t) and βi(t) respectively
αi(t) =
∑
j
Jijxj(t− 1)δsj(t−1),+1, (5a)
βi(t) =
∑
j
Jijxj(t− 1)δsj(t−1),−1. (5b)
Then the partition function can be rewritten as
Zi(t) = exp (αi(t)) + exp (βi(t)) . (6)
Define
Hi(t) =
1
2
(αi(t)− βi(t))
=
∑
j
Jijsj(t− 1)xj(t− 1)
2
, (7)
and substitute Zi(t) in (4) with Eq. (6), then we have
p(si(t)|S) = exp(αi(t))
exp(αi(t)) + exp(βi(t))
=
exp(si(t)Hi(t))
2 cosh(Hi(t))
=
1
2
[1 + si(t) tanh (Hi(t))] . (8)
During each time step, all players join the prisoners’
dilemma game and obtain corresponding payoff accord-
ing to the payoff matrix (3) from each counterpart. The
averaged gain during this time step for player i is derived
in Eq. (A1). However, only one of the players is going
to update his strategy, which is not necessarily change
his current choice. This is why we refer this dynamics as
asynchronous PD game.
III. INFERENCES FOR GAME NETWORKS
A. Maximum Log-likelihood Estimation (MSE)
Suppose we have the following data: history of play-
ers’ strategies s ≡ {si(t)}, updating times τ ≡ {τi} and
payoff of each player x ≡ {xi(t)}, of length L = T × N
steps. We reconstruct the game network based on these
data. This can be done by maximizing the likelihood
P (s, τ,x) = P (s,x|τ)p(τ) over these parameters. As
mentioned in [20], for each player i, the chance of updat-
ing their strategy is an Poisson process. This indicates
the probability of the update history p(τ) is independent
of the model parameters, thus we can take the objective
function as logP (s,x|τ) safely from Eq. (8),
L =
∑
i
∑
τi
[si(τi + δt)Hi(τi)− log 2 coshHi(τi)] . (9)
The sum only over the update times instead of all time
steps as in synchronous case [3]. Then it leads to a learn-
ing rule for couplings Jij
δJij ∝ ∂L
∂Jij
∝
∑
τi
[si(τi + δt)− tanhHi(τi)] sj(τi)xj(τi)
2
. (10)
We refer this algorithm as the “MLE”. It is an exact
method as no approximation is introduced to the deriva-
tion of the inference formula. Besides, it is notable that
if the rewards for each player equal to 2 and the same
with each other, then the PD game process degenerates
to the original Glauber dynamics [36].
B. naive Mean Field (nMF) approximation
We start from the master equation
dp(S; t)
dt
=
∑
i
ωi(−si(t))p(s1, ...,−si, ...sN ; t)
−
∑
i
ωi(si(t))p(S; t), (11)
and the flipping rate is:
ωi(S; t) =
1
2
[1− si(t) tanh (Hi(t))] . (12)
which could be obtained through detailed balanced con-
dition [37]:
p(−si)
p(si)
=
ω(si)
ω(−si) (13a)
p(−si) + p(si) = 1 (13b)
With strategy history for each player {si(t)}, the time-
dependent means and correlations can be defined as
mi(t) = 〈si(t)〉, (14a)
Cij(t− t0) = 〈si(t)sj(t0)〉 −mi(t)mj(t). (14b)
With Eqs. (11) and (12), the temporal behavior of
means and correlations are
dmi(t)
dt
= −mi(t) + 〈tanh[Hi(t)]〉, (15a)
d〈si(t)sj(t0)〉
dt
= −〈si(t)sj(t0)〉+ 〈tanh[Hi(t)]sj(t0)〉.
(15b)
4Thus the external field (influence) Hi(t) for player i at
time t in (7) could be rewritten as
Hi(t) =
∑
j
Jijsj(t)xj(t)
=
∑
j
Jij (B0 +B1sj(t− 1)) , (16)
where B0 = (1 − b)(1 + m¯(t))/4 and B1 = (1 + b)(1 +
m¯(t))/4 are two non-fluctuating term depending on pa-
rameter b and m¯(t) = 1N
∑
i si(t) is the population av-
erage. The detailed derivation of Eq. (16) is shown in
Appendix A.
The nMF approximation hence is formally the same
with that for original asynchronously updated kinetic
Ising model in [19],
mi = tanh bi, (17)
but with
bi =
∑
j∈∂i
Jij(B0 +B1mj), (18)
which is obtained by taking the stationary solution of Eq.
(15a) with naive mean field approximation. The details
are illustrated in Appendix B.
With the time-derivative of correlations in Eq. (15b),
the tanh function can be expanded with respect to bi,
yields
d
dt
〈si(t)sj(t0)〉+ 〈si(t)sj(t0)〉 (19)
= mimj +B1(1−m2i )
∑
k
Jik 〈δsk(t)δsj(t0)〉 . (20)
Denoting τ = t− t0, we get
d
dτ
Cij(τ) + Cij(τ) = B1(1−m2i )
∑
k
JikCkj(τ), (21)
With the limit τ → 0, we get the nMF inference formula
for the PD game network
J =
A−1DC−1
B1
, (22)
with D = C˙(0) + C(0), Aij = δij(1 − m2i ) and B1 =
(1 + b)(m¯ + 1)/4. With full data history, it is safe to
replace m¯(t) with the time average m¯ = 〈m¯(t)〉t.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We infer the evolutionary game network by MLE (10)
and nMF (22) formula respectively. In Fig. 1, the scatter
plots for reconstructed structure against the true ones
are presented for both methods. Fig. 1(a) is for the data
length L = N × 105 and Fig. 1(b) for L = N × 107.
It shows that both nMF and MLE perform better with
(a) (b)
FIG. 1. Scatter-plots for reconstructed couplings versus the
tested ones with different data length L. Blue open dots are
recovered couplings by nMF while open red upper triangles
are for MLE. Left panel: data length L = N×105; right panel:
data length L = N×107. The other parameters are the same:
number of players N = 20, asymmetric degree k = 1, coupling
strength g = 0.3.
larger data length L. Furthermore, MLE works slightly
better than nMF in both cases. The nMF method over
estimates the couplings especially for L = N × 107, as
shown in Fig. 1(b).
We introduce the mean square error (MSE) to mea-
sure the distance between the reconstructed and the true
tested network structure.
MSE =
∑
ij(J
Rec.
ij − JTrueij )2
N(N − 1) , (23)
where JTrueij are the tested network couplings and J
Rec.
ij
for the inferred ones.
With the reconstruction error MSE defined by (23), we
compared the performance of MLE and nMF method for
fully connected SK model (1). We study both methods
for different data length L, the asymmetric degree k, the
temptation of defection parameter b in the payoff matrix
(3) as well as the coupling strength g. The inverse of
g corresponds to the temperature in spin glass system,
which can be explained as the noise (say, fake information
or rumors etcetera) in the evolutionary PD game.
Figure 2 shows the performance of both methods. Sim-
ilar to the results for asynchronous Ising case [20], the
MSE for MLE is ∝ 1/L here. However, with the data
length L we tested here, nMF does not approach to a
saturated value as happened for asynchronous Ising case.
Instead, the reconstruction error MSE for nMF is about
twice of that for MLE, see Fig. 2(a). This could be an
indication for game network, nMF inference formula can
be obtained also by taken the average of update times
in MLE formula (10), which has been proved so in [20]
for asynchronous Ising models. Figure 2(b) shows the
MSE for both methods is not sensitive to the asymmet-
ric degree k, no matter the network is symmetric (k = 0)
or fully asymmetric (k = 1). Here, the data length
L = N × 106 with N = 20 and g = 0.3. The differ-
ence between two methods is effected mainly by the data
length L. The MSE for MLE is about half of that for
nMF approach, which agrees well with that shown in Fig.
2(a). Figure 2(c) shows the performance of MLE and
nMF algorithm for different reward parameter b in the
5×
×
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 2. (color online). Mean square error (MSE) for (a) data
length L , (b) asymmetric degree k, (c) b parameter in payoff
matrix and (d) temperature 1/g respectively. Blue open dots
present nMF while red solid dots for MLE. The parameters
are N = 20, L = N × 106, k = 1 and g = 0.3 except varied in
the corresponding panel.
payoff matrix (3), which is a specific parameter for game
networks. Both algorithms recover the network better
with larger reward b. However, the proportion of MSE
between nMF and MLE increases slightly for larger b.
Finally, the effects of inverse g over network inference is
illustrated in Fig. 2(d). For strong couplings, nMF works
much worse than MLE. However, for g ≤ 1, their perfor-
mances are not effected by g anymore. MLE still has its
advantage of the factor 2 (conferred by the information
of update times) compared with nMF.
To illustrate how the equilibrium inference method
works for the non-equilibrium process, we use the naive
mean-filed equilibrium inference [38] algorithm which de-
pends on the equal time correlations only:
JEqui = −C−1. (24)
We refer this as equilibrium inference to avoid the con-
fusion with the nMF method for asynchronous case we
derived here. Then, we present the inferred networks
through scatter-plots in Fig. 3 with both equilibrium and
non-equilibrium method for evolutionary data generated
by PD games.
Fig. 3(a) and (b) presents the reconstructed couplings
for symmetric (k = 0) and fully asymmetric (k = 1) SK
model respectively. Our asynchronous nMF (blue open
dots) and MLE (red upper triangle) methods recover the
couplings nicely while the equilibrium nMF (24) (open
black squares) works much worse, even for k = 0, the
symmetric case. It is not surprising as equilibrium nMF
(24) we tested here does not take into account the game
process at all. For the original asynchronous Ising model
without game process, the equilibrium nMF should work
as good as the non-equilibrium methods [22] since they
are for the same dynamics.
(a) (b)
FIG. 3. Scatter plot for recovered links with the tested
ones with different asymmetric degree k. Black open squares
are for inferred couplings with equilibrium inference Jequi =
−C(0)−1. Blue open dots are for asynchronous nMF while
red open triangles are for MLE. Left panel: asymmetric de-
gree k = 0, symmetric SK model; right panel: k = 1, fully
asymmetric SK model. The other parameters are the same:
data length L = N×106, number of players N = 20, coupling
strength g = 0.3.
V. DISCUSSION
We studied the network reconstruction problem with
asynchronous updated evolutionary game data. The
gamblers play the PD game with their counterparts si-
multaneously but update their strategies asynchronously.
Two methods (exact and iterative MLE and approximate
nMF) are introduced to infer the fully connected and
Gaussian distributed couplings between players.
Comparing with the original asynchronous Ising model
[19, 20], we combine the PD games with Glauber dynam-
ics, where the rewards during the game for each player is
considered. The MLE and nMF reconstruction formulae
for asynchronous Ising models in [19, 20] hence have to
be generalized for the asynchronous evolutionary game
case here. MLE is derived from the log-likelihood of the
system while nMF from the derivative of the equations
of motion of means and correlations. However, they are
not independent with each other. MLE utilizes the full
model histories, {si(t)}, {xi(t)} and {τi}. The update
histories in Eq. (10) could be averaged and yields the
nMF inference formula (22) by taking the linear term of
the averaged tanh function.
With the derived MLE and nMF methods for asyn-
chronously updates PD game, our numerical results show
that the inference performance of nMF is comparable
with that of MLE. Both methods are not sensitive to
the asymmetric degree k, but proportional to the inverse
of data length. For fixed data length, the reconstruction
error (MSE) of MLE is half (benefit from update times)
of that by nMF method. Furthermore, nMF prefers
small/weak coupling strength (g) while MLE holds for
much wider range of g. Both methods recover better for
large payoff parameter b. This is reasonable as when the
rewards of each players equal to 2, then the external field
6Eq. (7) in the dynamics degenerates to the original asyn-
chronous Ising model. With b increases, the rewards of
each players will also close to 2 which show better per-
formance of network reconstruction.
However, comparing with the data that MLE method
used for inference, nMF needs only the b parameter and
the moments of strategy history {si(t)}. Furthermore,
nMF infers much fast than MLE as no iterative proce-
dure included for network inference. The scatter-plots in
Fig. 1 and Fig. 3 show that the JnMFij s are obviously
comparable with JMLEij s, even though the MSE for nMF
is roughly twice of that for MLE. Thus, we expect that
for the network inference with data from asynchronous
PD game, nMF works well enough. The higher orders of
tanh function (say, TAP) are not necessary.
Besides, we have tested a widely used equilibrium infer-
ence method (24) blindly for our dynamic data generated
from evolutionary PD games, which recover much worse
than that by non-equilibrium inference methods, even for
symmetric interactions between players, as illustrated in
Fig. 3(a). This bring us a message that if we have time
series data generated from some certain dynamics, we
should try non-equilibrium methods first. Furthermore,
we start from the detailed balance condition to derive the
asynchronous nMF formula for the network inference, but
as shown by the numerical results, the inference formula
holds for asymmetric k = 1 case also where the system
is not in the equilibrium realm any more.
This work focuses on a simple and idealized prisoner’s
game with fully connected and Gaussian distributed in-
teractions, which could be extended to certain type of
structures or different distributions (say, random power-
law, where strong couplings between few players while
weak ones between most of them) for the couplings. Be-
sides, we use a constant value of defection temptation
b which could be different for each players. Meanwhile,
non-zero abut small r in the payoff matrix (3) could also
be tested. These will be studied by further work.
Appendix A: Reformulating the external field Hi(t)
According to the payoff matrix (3) for prisoner’s
dilemma game, the average reward that player i will gain
at time t is (for simplicity, r is assumed to be equal to
0):
xi(t) = 2×
1 + si(t)2 1N ∑
j∈∂i
1 + sj(t)
2
+
1− si(t)
2
b
N
∑
j∈∂i
1 + sj(t)
2
 . (A1)
The factor 2 outside the bracket comes from the fact that
players obtained rewards from the game with neighbors
as well as the games originated from neighbors within
each time step of synchronous PD games. Then si(t)
xi(t)
2
in Eq. (7) is:
si(t)
xi(t)
2
=
si(t) + 1
2
f(c) +
si(t)− 1
2
bf(c), (A2)
with f(c) the cooperation density in the neighborhood of
player i:
f(c) =
1
N
∑
j∈∂i
1 + sj(t)
2
=
m¯(t) + 1
2
. (A3)
Hence we rewrite Eq. (A2) as:
si(t)
xi(t)
2
= B0 +B1si(t), (A4)
with
B0 =
1− b
2
f(c) =
(1− b)(m¯(t) + 1)
4
, (A5a)
B1 =
1 + b
2
f(c) =
(1 + b)(m¯(t) + 1)
4
, (A5b)
and m¯(t) = 1N
∑
i si(t).
Thus, we reformulated eq. (7) as:
Hi(t) =
∑
j
Jij (B0 +B1sj(t− 1)) . (A6)
Appendix B: nMF approximation
Substituting sj(t− 1) with non-fluctuating and fluctu-
ating terms as:
Hi(t) =
∑
j
Jij(B0 +B1(mj + δsj(t− 1))), (B1)
and define
bi =
∑
j
Jij(B0 +B1mj), (B2)
then
〈tanh[Hi(t)]〉 =
〈
tanh
bi +B1∑
j
Jijδsj(t− 1)
〉 .
(B3)
expanding the tanh function with respect to bi to the first
order, we get:
〈tanh[Hi(t)]〉
= tanh bi +B1(1− tanh2 bi)
〈∑
j
Jijδsj(t− 1)
〉
, (B4)
where the second term on the right hand-side goes to
zero. Hence we have naive mean-field approximation for
mi as:
mi = tanh bi. (B5)
which is the stationary solution of the time derivative of
magnetization in equation (15a).
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